Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 34827 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
8-12-2008
Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC Respondent's
Brief Dckt. 34827
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34827" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1518.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1518
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 





SAGE HEALTH CARE, PLLC, an Idaho ) 
limited liability company; CHARLES C. ) 
NOVAK, M.D., DAVID A. KENT, M.D.; ) 




SAGE HEALTH CARE, PLLC, an Idaho ) 
limited liability company; CHARLES C. ) 
NOV AK, M.D., DAVID A. KENT, M.D.; ) 
And ROBERTO NEGRON, M.D., ) 
) 
Counter Claimants-Respondents, ) 
vs. ) 
) 
STEPHEN BUSHI, M.D., ) 
) 
Counter Defendant - Appellant. ) 
SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 34827 
Fil_ ED - COPY r-t AUG I 2 2008 
Supreme~_,ourt __ Court of Appeals __ 
........_ Entered on ATS by;_ 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District for Ada County 
Honorable Cheri C. Copsey, District Judge, Presiding 
Steven F. Schossberger, !SB No. 5358 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & 
!{;\WLEY,LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
C. Tom Arkoosh 
CAPITOL LAW 
GROUP,PLLC 
302 Main Street 
P. 0. Box32 
Gooding, ID 83330 
Forrest R. Goodrum, !SB #4451 
MUNTHER GOODRUM SPERRY, CHTD. 
The Mallard Building #350 
1 161 W. River Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorneys for Defendants~Respondents 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................................... .l 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE ...................................................... I 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................... 2 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ............................... 9 
III. ARGUMENT ............................................................................. .! 1 
A. The District Court's Decision Granting Sage's Motion For 
Summary Judgment Should Be Sustained .................................. 11 
I. The Sage Operating Agreement was Amended 
on January 30, 2006, In Full Compliance With 
the Terms of the Agreement, and the Requirements ofldaho ........... 11 
2. Bushi Was Removed as a Member in Accordance 
With the Terms of the Sage Operating Agreement, 
as Amended, and in Compliance With the Terms of 
the Idaho Limited Liability Company Act .................................. 13 
3. When Bushi's Membership Was Terminated, Sage 
Tendered Checks for the Fair Value of His Membership, 
Plus All Profit Distributions Due to Him Under the Agreements 
Through January 3 I, 2006, His Date of Termination ..................... 13 
4. The District Court Did Not Resolve Material Factual Issues 
Which Were in Dispute in Favor of the Defendants ....................... 15 
5. The District Court Did Not Resolve Material Factual Issues 
Which Were in Dispute in Favor of the Defendants or Rely on 
Facts Not in the Record ........................................................ 16 
6. Sage Did Not Breach Its Fiduciary Duties to Bushi ...................... 21 
a. Bushi breached the Operating Agreement and breached 
his fiduciary duties to Sage .......................................... 21 
b. The other members of Sage acted in fulfillment of their 
fiduciary duties to the Company and to one another when 
they removed Bushi as a member. ................................ 22 
c. Under Idaho case law, Sage's actions in compliance with the 
express terms of the Operating Agreement are not a breach of 
fiduciary duty .......................................................... 23 
d. Other jurisdictions concur, no breach of fiduciary duty occurs 
where the action taken is permitted under the Agreement ....... 24 
e. The unreported decisions cited by Bushi are not proper 
precedent and are distinguishable on their facts ................... 26 
B. Bushi Has Not Raised a Material Issue of Fact as to Whether Sage's 
Other Members Breached Their Fiduciary Duties ......................... 27 
C. Sage Did Not Breach Its Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing ...... 30 
D. Sage Asked for Attorneys Fees under LC. 12-120(3) as a Prevailing 
Party in a Commercial Transaction ......................................... 33 
E. Bushi Had an Opportunity to Oppose an Award of Attorney's Fees 
Under 12-120(3), Made His Argument and Lost ......................... .34 
F. The Attorney's Fees and Discretionary Costs Awarded by the Court 
Below Were Within the Court's Sound Discretion ....................... .35 
G. Bushi's Oppositions to Sage's Fee Application Did Not Comply with 
Court Rules and Bushi Cannot Cure Those Deficiencies by 
"Arguments" presented in the Appellant's Brief. .......................... 40 
H. Sage is entitled to Attorney's Fees on Appeal as a Prevailing 
Party in a Commercial Transaction Pursuant to LC. 12-120(3) 
and IAR 41 ..................................................................... .41 
IV. CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 42 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Anderson v. Wilder, 2003 Westlaw 22768666 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003) .............. 28 
Beale v. Speck, 127 Idaho 521,537,903 P.2d 110, 126 (Ct. App. 1995) ......................... 42 
Bingham v. Montane Resources Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 987 P.2d 1035 (1999) ........ 38 
Bliss Valley Foods, 824 p.2d at 863 .................................................................................. 33 
Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. v. Idaho I'' National Bank, 121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d at 863 33, 34 
Bodine v. Bodine, 114 Idaho 163, 167-68, 754 P.2d 1200, 1204-05 (Ct. App. 1988) ...... 42 
Burton v. Atomic Workers Federal Credit Union, 119 Idaho 17, 803 P.2d 518 (1990) ... 33 
Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878 (Ct. App. 1984) ............................................................. 22 
Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 115 Idaho 298, 766 P.2d 768, 770 (1988) ......... 33, 34 
Crqft Wall of Idaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker, 108 Idaho 704, 706, 701 P.2d 324,326 (Ct. 
App. 1985) .................................................................................................................... 40 
Daisy Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259,263, 999 P.2d 
914, 918 (Ct. App. 2000) .............................................................................................. 39 
First Security Bank of Idaho v. Gaige, 115 Idaho 172, 765 P.2d 683, 687 (1988) .......... 33 
Goodman v. Lathrop, 143 Idaho 622, 627 (2007) ............................................................ 30 
Gowin v. Granite Depot, LLC., 272 Va., 246,634 S.E.2d 714 (2006) ............................. 23 
Hooper v. State, 127 Idaho 945, 949 (Ct. App. 1995) ...................................................... 44 
Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 9 P.2d 1204, 1216 (2000) .. 33, 34 
Independence Lead Mines Company v. Hecla Mining Company, 143 Idaho 22, _, 137 
P.2d 409, 413(2006) ...................................................................................................... 34 
Ledford v. Smith, 274 Ga. App. 714,618 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. App. 2005) ............................ 27 
Magic Lantern Productions, Inc. v. Dolsat, 126 Idaho 805 (1993) .................................. 36 
Mason v. Tucker and Assoc. S, 125 Idaho 429, 432 (Ct. App. 1994) ............................... 44 
McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enterprises, 132 Ohio App.3d 657, 725 N.E.2d 1193, Ohio 
App. 10 Dist. (1999) ..................................................................................................... 27 
McGee v. Best, 106 S.W.3d 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) ..................................................... 28 
Nanney v Line/la, Inc., 130 Idaho 477,480 (Ct. App. 1997) ................................ 28, 41, 42 
Olson v. Idaho State University, 125 Idaho 177, 868 P.2d 505, 510 (App.1994) ............ 34 
Operating Engs. Local Union 370 v. Goodwin Const. Co. of Blackfoot, 104 Idaho 83, 85 
(Ct. App. 1982) ............................................................................................................. 44 
Patton v. Patton, 88 Idaho 288 (1965) .............................................................................. 44 
Purcell v. Southern Hill Investments, LLC, 847 N.E.2D 1991 (Ind. App., 2006) ............ 23 
Richard J and Esther E. Wooley Trust v. DeBest Pluming, Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 186-87, 
983 P.2d 834, 840-41 (1999) ........................................................................................ 42 
Shawvers v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC., 140 Idaho 254, 93 P.2d 685 (2004) ............ 35, 36 
State v. Shama Res. Ltd P'ship, 127 Idaho 267,271 (1995) ............................................ 30 
State v. Stricklin, 136 Idaho 264,269 (Ct. of App. 2001) ................................................ 19 
Tolley v. THI Co., 140 Idaho 253, 92 P.3d 513 (2004) ............................................... 25, 37 
Totman v. Eastern Idaho Technical College, 129 Idaho 714,931 P.2d 1232, 1236 
(App.1997) .................................................................................................................... 34 
Victoria Corp. Sole v. Corporate Business Park, LLC, 138 Wash. App. 443, 158, P.3d 
1183 (App. Div. 2, 2007) .............................................................................................. 26 
Weiner v. Lazard Everest Co., 241 A.D.2d 114, 122 (1 st App. Dept. 1998) .................... 29 
Wiseman v. Schaffer, 115 Id 537, 541 (Ct. App. 1989) .................................................... 19 
Wooley Trust, 133 Idaho at 187,983 P.2d at 841 ............................................................. 42 
Zimmerman v Volkswagen of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 858, 920 P.2d 67, 74 (1996) 
....................................................................................................................................... 42 
Zulawski v. Taylor, 2005 Westlaw 3823584 (N.Y. Supp.) ............................................... 29 
Statutes 
LC.§ 45-413 ..................................................................................................................... 38 
LC. § 53-623(2) ................................................................................................................. 11 
LC.§ 53-668 ..................................................................................................................... 16 
LC. §53-630 ...................................................................................................................... 14 
LC. §53-641 ................................................................................................................ 14, 15 
LC. 12-120 ...................................................................................................... 10, 11, 36, 45 
LC. 12-120(3) .................................................................................................. 10, 11, 36, 45 
Idaho Limited Liability Company Act, LC. §§ 53-601 ...................................................... 2 
Other Authorities 
LS.Ct. Op.R. 15(f) ............................................................................................................ 28 
IAR 40 and 41 ................................................................................................................... 45 
IAR 41 ......................................................................................................................... 11, 45 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the District Court's grant of summary judgment and 
an award of attorney's fees in favor of the defendants, Sage Health Care, PLLC, and three 
members of the Company, Charles C. Novak, M.D., David A. Kent, M.D., and Roberto 
Negron, M.D. (hereinafter "Sage"). The plaintiff, Stephan Bushi, M.D. (hereinafter 
"Bushi") is a former member of Sage. Bushi' s membership was terminated after the 
other members had discovered that he had converted some $61,000 in Company funds 
through use of the Company's line of credit at Wells Fargo Bank without the knowledge 
or consent of the other members. For the purpose of terminating Bushi's membership, 
the other members made amendments to the Operating Agreement. The amendments 
were made in accordance with the express terms of the Agreement. Bushi was tendered 
payment in full for his membership at the price specified in the Operating Agreement. 
The operative provisions of the Agreement about which Bushi now complains, are 
expressly permitted under the terms of the Idaho Limited Liability Company Act. 
Bushi now claims on appeal that the actions taken by the other members pursuant 
to the Operating Agreement constitute a breach of fiduciary duty and a breach of a 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. He also complains that the attorney's fees 
awarded by the Court were improperly awarded and excessive. 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a contract case. Bushi wanted to be paid more for his interest in the 
limited liability company than the Operating Agreement provided. He took the position 
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that unless his demands were met, he would not give up his membership in the Company. 
The other members stood firm. Acting in accordance with the express provisions of the 
Operating Agreement and the Idaho Limited Liability Company Act, the other members 
terminated Bushi' s membership and tendered him payment in full of all monies he was 
due under the Operating Agreement. 
Bushi instituted this lawsuit. Initially he claimed that the payment provisions of 
the Operating Agreement entitled him to much more money than the amount tendered to 
him. Sage had tendered $16,383.30. Bushi claimed he was entitled to receive an amount 
in excess of $275,000 for his membership. The District Court rules in favor of Sage on 
this issue in granting summary judgment. Bushi does not appeal this issue. Instead, 
Bushi now claims that notwithstanding a clear legislative mandate and more than clear 
provisions in the Operating Agreement (discussed below), permitting termination of his 
membership, these must be trumped under a theory of fiduciary duty or a theory of 
breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sage Health Care, PLLC, is an Idaho limited liability company, organized under 
the provisions of the Idaho Limited Liability Company Act, LC. §§ 53-601 et seq. 
(Record, p. 23, ,r 1 ). 
Sage was originally formed in 1994. Since then it has gone through several 
changes in membership and several name changes as detailed in the Verified 
Complaint. In 1994, when Sage was formed, the Members entered into an Operating 
Agreement. Between 1994 and January 30, 2006, provisions of the Operating 
Agreement remained unchanged except for changes to Exhibit "A" of the Agreement 
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reflecting changes in membership interests. A true copy of the Operating Agreement 
as it existed prior to its amendment on January 30, 2006, is appended to the Verified 
Answer and Counterclaim as Exhibit A. Bushi has been a signatory to the Operating 
Agreement beginning in 1994 and continuing through January 30, 2006 (Record, p. 27, 
11 ). 
Since 1994, the Operating Agreement provided a method to amend its terms and 
determine valuation upon dissociation. It also addressed the grounds for dissociation 
of its members and the dissociating member's rights. The Operating Agreement 
vested management in Sage Health Care's Members with equal rights in the 
company's management. See Article VI, Section 1 . On these issues, the Operating 
Agreement provided in relevant part as follows: 
ARTICLE VI 
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MEMBERS 
**** 
3. Unanimous Minus One - The following actions 
require the consent of all but one of the Members: 
3 .1 any amendment to this Company agreement; 
**** 
ARTICLE XI 
DISSOCIATION OF A MEMBER 
1. Mandatory Dissociation - A Person shall cease to 
be a Member upon the happening of any of the following 
events: 
1.1 the Withdrawal of a Member with the consent of the 
Majority of the remaining Members prior to the date set 
forth in Section 5 of Article II; 
1.2 in the case of a Member who is a natural person, the 
death of the Member or the entry of an order by a court of 
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competent jurisdiction adjudicating the Member 
incompetent to manage the Member's person [sic] estate; 
1.3 in the case of a Member who is acting as a Member 
by virtue of being a trustee in a trust, the termination of the 
trust (but not merely the substitution of a new trustee); 
1.4 In the case of a Member that is a separate 
Organization other than a corporation, the dissolution and 
commencement of winding up of the separate 
Organization; 
1.5 in the case of a Member that is a corporation, the 
filing of a certificate of dissolution, or its equivalent, for the 
corporation or the revocation of its charter; or 
2. Dissociation by Vote - A person shall cease to be a 
Member upon a majority vote of other Members, upon the 
happening of any of the following events: 
2.1 the bankruptcy of a Member; 
2.2 the attachment, levy or execution upon a Member's 
Membership Interest; 
2.3 the Member's loss of professional license; 
2.4 a finding by a Member's professional society that the 
Member is guilty of an ethical violation; 
2.5 the Member is unable to obtain professional liability 
insurance coverage; 
2.6. the Member is convicted of a felony. 
3. Rights of Dissociating Member - In the event any 
Member dissociates prior to the expiration of the term: 
**** 
3 .2 If the dissociation does not cause a dissolution and 
winding up of the Company under Article XIII, the 
Member shall be entitled to an amount equal to the value of 
the Member's Membership Interest in the Company, to be 
paid within six months of the date of dissociation. 
Notwithstanding the forgoing, if the dissociation is other 
than as a result of the death or incompetence of the 
Member, the Company may pay the value of the Member's 
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Membership Interest out over a period not to exceed five 
years, provided the dissociating Member shall be entitled to 
participate as an Assignee in the Company until the value 
of such interest (plus interest at the Default Interest Rate) is 
paid in full. 
3.3 The value of the Member's Membership Interest 
shall be determined by the Company's regular accountant 
based on the book value of the Company's regular 
accountant based on the book value of the Company's 
property, cash on hand and accounts receivable (less the 
appropriate discount for uncollectible accounts) minus all 
liabilities. No value shall be attributable to good will. The 
value of the Member's Membership Interest shall include 
the amount of any distributions to which the Member is 
entitled under the Company Agreement and the fair value 
of the Member's Membership Interest as of the date of 
dissociation based upon the Member's right to share in 
Distributions from the Company reduced by any damages 





1. Company Agreement May be Modified- The Company 
Agreement may be modified as provided in this Article 
XIV (as the same may, from time to time be amended). No 
Member shall have any vested rights in the Company 
Agreement which may not be modified through an 
amendment to the Company Agreement. 
2. Amendment or Modification of Company Agreement -
The Company Agreement may be amended or modified 
from time to time only by a written instrument adopted and 
executed by the Members pursuant to Article VI, Section 
3.1. 
(Record, p.l 00) 
On July 3, 2003 Sage obtained a business line of credit loan from Wells Fargo 
Bank (the Bank) under account No. 5474 6488 0066 7547 (the business line of credit). 
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The business line of credit was intended to serve as a back up source of liquidity for 
Sage if and when needed (Record, p. 27, 12). 
Since the inception of the business line of credit, it has never been used by Sage 
for Company purposes (Record, p. 27, 13). 
In October 2005, a mailing was received by Sage from the Bank which indicated 
that substantial funds had been borrowed under the business line of credit. Neither 
Sage's business manager nor any of the members other than Bushi had any knowledge 
of the borrowings as aforesaid prior to the receipt of the referenced notice, nor had 
they, in any way, consented or agreed to said borrowings (Record, p. 27, 14). 
Following receipt of the mailing aforesaid, Sage contacted the Bank and requested 
information concerning borrowings under the business line of credit. The information 
provided by the Bank indicated that the borrowings under the business line of credit 
had been made by Bushi and that the funds from the borrowings had been paid over to 
Bushi at his authorization and request. The Bank pointed out that Bushi was a member 
of Sage and had been one of the authorized signatories for the business line of credit 
(Record, p. 27, 15). 
Information provided by the Bank further indicated that the Bank had been 
instructed to forward all of the business line of credit account statements to the address 
of 890 Curling, Boise, Idaho, which was Bushi' s address, not the address of Sage 
(Record, p. 27, 16). 
The other members of Sage confronted Bushi with the information received from 
the Bank and demanded an explanation. Bushi acknowledged that he had personally 
received the funds borrowed under the business line of credit and converted those 
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funds for his own use. The other members of Sage demanded that Bushi immediately 
repay the funds which he had converted from the Company's business line of credit. 
Then, and on numerous subsequent occasions, Bushi promised to repay all the funds 
which he had converted from the Company's business line of credit, but through the 
date of the termination of his membership on January 30, 2006, he had failed to make 
such repayment. Bushi failed to repay the funds he had converted as aforesaid until 
June 2006, after Sage had filed a civil action against him in the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada under Case No. CVOC 0610585 
(Record, p. 28, if7). A true copy of the Verified Complaint in that action is appended 
to the Verified Answer and Counterclaim as Exhibit "C". 
Subsequent to the filing of CVOC 0610585, Bushi paid off all amounts due and 
owing on the line of credit. Upon receipt of payment from Bushi, Sage filed a notice 
of dismissal. 
In addition to being an unlawful conversion of funds, the actions of Bushi as 
aforesaid were also a breach of the express provisions of the Operating Agreement, in 
particular, Article VI, Section 2.6 which provides as follows: 
"2. Two Thirds Majority - the following actions require 
the consent of two-thirds majority of the members: ... 
2.6. The lending of money, investment and 
reinvestment of the Company's funds, and receipt and 
holding of property of security for repayment, including, 
without limitation, the loaning of money to and otherwise 
helping members, officers, employees and agents." 
None of the other members voted in favor of making any "loan" to Bushi or even 
had knowledge that he was converting the Company's funds to his own use. (Record, p. 
32 ,rs). 
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On January 24, 2006, Sage served on Bushi a notice of the Meeting of Members 
of Sage Health Care, PLLC, signed by Defendant/Counterclaimant Novak, which 
provided Notice of the following. 
1) An amendment to the Operating Agreement pursuant to Article XI Section 
3.1; 
2) Following the amendment to the Operating Agreement, the termination of the 
membership of a member, pursuant to the Operating Agreement as amended: 
3) Continuation of the business and existence of the Company (Record, p. 33, 
13). 
On January 30, 2006, at the meeting noticed as aforesaid with all members in 
attendance, Bushi represented by counsel, Brian C. Larsen, pursuant to Proxy Agreement, 
the members voted to amend Article XI, Section 1 to add subsection 1.6 that by an 
affirmative vote of all but one of the members a person shall cease to be a member. As 
provided in the Operating Agreement, the amendment was adopted by an affirmative vote 
of all but one of the members, Bushi voting against the amendment (Record, p. 33, 14). 
Following the amendment of the Operating Agreement, the members acted upon 
the amendment to Section 1.6 as aforesaid and voted for the mandatory dissociation of 
Bushi as a member of Sage and that his membership in Sage terminate immediately. 
This action was taken by an affirmative vote of all but one of the members, with Bushi's 
vote being cast against his disassociation (Record, p. 33, 15). 
The actions of the members were taken in accordance with the express terms of 
the Operating Agreement and the Operating Agreement as amended, and Defendant 
Bushi is a signatory to the Operating Agreement (Record, p. 34, 16). 
Article XI Section 3 .3 .3 of the Sage Operating Agreement provides the method 
for determining the value of any membership interest in Sage and was reproduced above. 
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The quoted section is the exclusive method used under the terms of the Operating 
Agreement for the determination of the value of the membership interest of a dissociating 
member under any circumstances and for any reason whatsoever (Record p. 34, ~7). 
In accordance with the provisions of the Operating Agreement, the Company's 
regular accountant calculated the amounts due to Bushi which are $5,138.30 as final 
payment for 2005 profits and $11,245.00 for buyout ofBushi's membership interest. The 
calculation amounts are fully detailed in the Affidavit of said accountant, Craig 
Rasmussen (Record, p. 86, Ex. 4). The Summary Judgment below confirmed this was 
the correct amount owed Bushi under the Agreement. Bushi takes no appeal on this 
issue. 
Under cover ofletter dated July 11, 2006, two checks in the amount of$! 1,245.00 
and $5,138.27 were forwarded to counsel for Bushi and tendered as payment in full. 
True copies of the checks and the cover letter aforesaid are appended to the Verified 
Answer and Counterclaim as Exhibit D (Record p. 30, ~3). 
By letter dated July 18, 2006, counsel for Bushi refused tender of the amounts 
aforesaid and returned the checks (Record, p. 30, ~ 4). 
II. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. The District Court's Decision Granting Sage's Motion For Summary 
Judgment Should Be Sustained 
I. The Sage Operating Agreement was Amended on January 30, 2006, In 
Full Compliance With the Terms of the Agreement, and the Requirements ofldaho. 
2. Bushi Was Removed as a Member in Accordance With the Terms of the 
Sage Operating Agreement, as Amended, and in Compliance With the Terms of the 
Idaho Limited Liability Company Act. 
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3. When Bushi's Membership Was Terminated, Sage Tendered Checks for 
the Fair Value of His Membership, Plus All Profit Distributions Due to Him Under the 
Agreements Through January 31, 2006, His Date of Termination. 
4. Both the Idaho Legislature and the Parties to the Operating Agreement 
Intended That the Provisions of the Operating Agreement Should Govern. 
5. The District Court Did Not Resolve Material Factual Issues Which Were 
in Dispute in Favor of the Defendants. The District Court Did Not Rely on Facts Not in 
the Record. 
6. Sage Did Not Breach Its Fiduciary Duties to Bushi. 
a. Bushi breached his duties under the Operating Agreement and 
breached his fiduciary duty to Sage. 
b. The other members of Sage acted in fulfillment of their fiduciary 
duties to the Company and to one another when they removed Bushi as a member. 
c. Under Idaho case law, Sage's actions in compliance with the 
express terms of the Operating Agreement are not a breach of fiduciary duty. 
d. Other jurisdictions concur, no breach of fiduciary duty occurs 
where the action taken is permitted under the Agreement. 
e. The unreported decisions cited by Bushi are not proper precedent 
and are distinguishable on their facts. 
B. Bushi Has Not Raised a Material Issue of Fact as to Whether Sage's Other 
Members Breached Their Fiduciary Duties. 
C. Sage Did Not Breach Its Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
D. Sage Asked for Attorneys Fees under I.C. 12-120(3) as a Prevailing Party 
in a Commercial Transaction. 
E. Bushi Had an Opportunity to Oppose an Award of Attorney's Fees Under 
12-120(3 ), Made His Argument and Lost. 
F. The Attorney's Fees and Discretionary Costs Awarded by the Court 
Below Were Within the Court's Sound Discretion. 
G. Bushi's Oppositions to Sage's Fee Application Did Not Comply with 
Court Rules and Bushi Cannot Cure Those Deficiencies by "Arguments" presented in the 
Appellant's Brief. 
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H. Sage is entitled to Attorney's Fees on Appeal as a Prevailing Party in a 
Commercial Transaction Pursuant to I.C. 12-120(3) and IAR 41. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court's Decision Granting Sage's Motion For Summary 
Judgment Should Be Sustained 
1. The Sage Operating Agreement was Amended on January 30, 2006, 
In Full Compliance With the Terms of the Agreement, and the 
Requirements of Idaho Law. 
Sage Health Care, PLLC is an Idaho limited liability company, organized under 
the provisions of the Idaho Limited Liability Company Act, LC.§§ 53-601 et seq. 
LC. §§ 53-623(2) provides that an operating agreement may include written 
provision for amendment of the operating agreement by less than a unanimous vote: 
" ... Unless otherwise provided in writing in an operating agreement, the 
affirmative vote, approval or consent of all members shall be required to: (a) 
Amend a written operating agreement ... " (emphasis added) 
The Operating Agreement adopted by Sage Health Care's Members provides a 
method to amend. Two separate provisions address the amendment procedure - Articles 
VI, Section 3.1 and XIV, Section 1 and 2 which read as follows: 
ARTICLE VI 
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MEMBERS 
**** 
3. Unanimous Minus One -The following actions require the consent of 
all but one of the Members: 
3 .1 any amendment to this Company agreement; 
Respondent's Brief - Page 11 
ARTICLE XIV 
AMENDMENT 
1. Company Agreement May be Modified - The Company Agreement 
may be modified as provided in this Article XIV (as the same may, from time to 
time be amended). No Member shall have any vested rights in the Company 
Agreement which may not be modified through an amendment to the Company 
Agreement. 
2. Amendment or Modification of Company Agreement - The Company 
Agreement may be amended or modified from time to time only by a written 
instrument adopted and executed by the Members pursuant to Article VI, Section 
3.1. 
(Record, pp. 48, 56) 
On January 24, 2006, Sage served on Bushi a notice of the Meeting of Members 
of Sage Health Care, PLLC, signed by Defendant/Counterclaimant Novak, which 
provided Notice of the following. 
4) An amendment to the Operating Agreement pursuant to Article XI Section 
3.1; 
5) Following the amendment to the Operating Agreement, the termination of the 
membership of a member, pursuant to the Operating Agreement as amended; 
6) Continuation of the business and existence of the Company. 
On January 30, 2006 at the meeting, noticed as aforesaid with all members in 
attendance, Bushi represented by counsel, Brian C. Larsen, pursuant to Proxy Agreement, 
the members voted to amend Article XI, Section 1 to add subsection 1.6 that by an 
affirmative vote of all but one of the members a person shall cease to be a member. As 
provided in the Operating Agreement, the amendment was adopted by an affirmative vote 
of all but one of the members, Bushi voting against the amendment. 
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2. Bushi Was Removed as a Member in Accordance With the Terms of 
the Sage Operating Agreement, as Amended, and in Compliance With 
the Terms of the Idaho Limited Liability Company Act. 
Following the amendment of the Operating Agreement, the members acted upon 
the amendment to Section 1.6 as aforesaid and voted for the mandatory dissociation of 
Bushi as a member of Sage and that his membership in Sage terminate immediately. 
This action was taken by an affirmative vote of all but one of the members, with Bushi's 
vote being cast against his disassociation. 
The actions of the members of the aforesaid were taken in full compliance with 
the express terms of the Operating Agreement and the Operating Agreement as amended 
and Defendant Bushi as a signatory to the Operating Agreement is bound by those 
actions. 
This action was taken in compliance with the provisions of LC. §53-641: 
"Events of dissociation-(1) A person ceases to be a 
member of a limited liability company upon occurrence of 
one (I) or more of the following events: ... 
( c) The member is removed as a member; 
(i) In accordance with an operating agreement ... " 
3. When Bushi's Membership Was Terminated, Sage Tendered Checks 
for the Fair Vaine of His Membership, Plus All Profit Distributions 
Due to Him Under the Agreements Through January 31, 2006, His 
Date of Termination. 
Idaho Code §53-630 authorizes inclusion in an operating agreement of provisions 
for payment for a member's interest upon removal of a member: 
Idaho Limited Liability Company Act LC. §§53-601 et seq. 
Distributions on an event of dissociation.- Unless otherwise provided in 
writing in an operating agreement, if a member dissociates from a limited 
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liability company without resulting in a dissolution under section 53-642, 
Idaho Code; 
(!) And if the member is removed as a member pursuant to section 53-
641(c), Idaho Code1, then the member shall receive within a reasonable 
time after dissociation the fair value of the member's interest in the limited 
liability company as of the date of dissociation limited liability company 
as if the limited liability company were wound up as of that date; 
(Emphasis added) 
Article XI Section 3 .3 .3 of the Sage Operating Agreement provides the method 
for determining the value ofBushi's membership interest in Sage. It provides in part as 
follows: 
3.3.3 The value of the Member's Membership Interest shall be 
determined by the Company's regular accountant based on the 
book value of the Company's property, cash on hand and accounts 
receivable (less an appropriate discount for uncollectible accounts) 
minus all liabilities. No value shall be attributed to good will. The 
value of the Member's Membership Interest shall include the 
amount of any Distributions to which the Member is entitled under 
the Company Agreement and the fair value of the Member's 
Membership Interest on the date of dissociation based upon the 
Member's right to share in Distributions from the Company 
reduced by any damages sustained by the Company as a result of 
the Member's dissociation. 
The above quoted section is the exclusive method used under the terms of the Operating 
Agreement for the determination of the value of the Membership interest of a dissociating 
member under any circumstances and for any reason whatsoever. 
The company tendered checks to Bushi for the full amount owed under the terms 
of the agreements (Record pp. 30, 72, 73 and 74). The District Court held that Sage had 
properly determined the amounts due Bushi for his member's interest and his profit 
1 I.C. §53-641 ( c) provides, in pertinent part: 
" ... ( 1) a person ceases to be a member of a limited liability company upon tbe occurrence ofone (I) or 
more of the following events: ... 
(c) the member is removed as a member:: 
(i) in accordance with an operating agreement..." 
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distribution through his date of termination, January 31, 2006 (Record, p. 115). Bushi 
has not appealed on this issue (Appellants Brief, p. 9). 
4. Both the Idaho Legislature and the Parties to the Operating 
Agreement Intended That the Provisions of the Operating Agreement Should 
Govern. 
The Idaho Legislature has spoken as follows: 
LC. § 53-668. 
"(l) It is intended that the provisions of this chapter 
(the Limited Liability Company Act) give maximum effect 
to the principal of freedom of contract and to the 
enforceability of Operating Agreements. 
(2) Unless displaced by particular provisions of this 
chapter, the principles of law and equity supplement the 
provisions of this chapter." 
The District Court correctly obeyed this legislative mandate (Record p. 107). 
In the Operating Agreement, the parties agreed as follows: 
"2. Agreement - For and in consideration of the 
mutual covenants herein contained and for other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which 
is hereby acknowledged, the Members executing the 
Company Agreement hereby agree to the terms and 
conditions of the Company Agreement, as it may from time 
to time be amended according to its terms. It is the express 
intention of the Members that the Company Agreement 
shall be the sole source of agreement of the parties, and, 
except to the extent a provision of the Company Agreement 
expressly incorporates federal income tax rules by 
reference to sections of the Code or Regulations or is 
expressly prohibited or ineffective under the Act, the 
Company Agreement shall govern, even when inconsistent 
with, or different than, the provisions of the Act or any 
other law or rule. To the extent any provision of the 
Company Agreement is prohibited or ineffective under the 
Act, the Company Agreement shall be considered amended 
to the smallest degree possible in order to make the 
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agreement effective under the Act. In the event the Act is 
subsequently amended or interpreted in such a way to make 
any provision of the Company Agreement that was 
formerly invalid valid, such provision shall be considered 
to be valid from the effective date of such interpretation or 
amendment." 
Operating Agreement, Article II (Record p. 45) (Emphasis Added). 
I. Company Agreement may be Modified - The 
Company Agreement may be modified as provided in this 
Article XIV (as the same may, from time to time be 
amended). No Member shall have any vested rights in the 
Company Agreement which may not be modified through 
an amendment to the Company Agreement. 
Operating Agreement, Article XIV (Record p. 56). (Emphasis Added.) 
The District Court correctly took cognizance of the Operating Agreement and 
enforced its terms in granting summary judgment (Record p. 106). 
Bushi now asks you to ignore the Idaho Legislature, ignore the plain language of 
the Operating Agreement and consider a conflicting "fiduciary duty" argument which he 
advances. Bushi is arguing that he has a vested right which may not be modified through 
an amendment to the Company Agreement. Exactly the opposite of what the Agreement 
says. We suggest he is clutching at straws. 
5. The District Court Did Not Resolve Material Factual Issues Which 
Were in Dispute in Favor of the Defendants or Rely on Facts Not in 
the Record. 
The "Factual Issues" referenced in this section ofBushi's brief were not 
considered by the District Court in granting summary judgment to Sage. 
"Given the Operating Agreement language, the Members' 
reasons for disassociation are irrelevant to this decision." 
Order Granting Summary Judgment p. 14, n. 15 (Record p. 109) 
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At Page IO of Bushi' s brief, Bushi alleges that he was kicked out of the company 
because he was "dating" a nurse practitioner employed by the Company and he had 
formed a business affiliation with a competing group of psychiatrists. He characterizes 
these as "stated reasons for wanting to disassociate". No doubt the other members 
complained about these two items and their complaints are reflected in the record. Why 
wouldn't they complaint? Anyone would. 
However, the minutes of the meeting where Bushi's membership was terminated 
do not state the reasons. But, those reasons are clearly demonstrated by the attendant 
circumstances. The fact is that Bushi was not content with "dating" a Company 
employee and working for a rival psychiatric group which competed with Sage for 
hospital contracts. The final insult was his conversion of$61,000 in Company funds to 
his own use. 
It is an unsavory prospect to accuse a prominent doctor and long-time business 
associate of embezzlement. No such accusation has been made by the defendants in this 
action. Rather, they have characterized Bushi' s pirating of Company credit as a 
"conversion". This is consistent throughout the pleadings both in the action here and in 
the previous action which defendants filed to get their money back. No good deed goes 
unpunished. 
At Page 10 of Bushi' s brief, he claims "Dr. Bushi' s use of the line of credit was 
not an act of conversion, instead it was simply a matter of Dr. Bushi's misunderstanding 
of the name under which the line of credit had been opened." The citing reference is to 
Bushi's own affidavit, ,i 32, where he makes a self-serving statement as follows: 
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" ... We also discussed how I could immediately pay 
back the Wells Fargo business line of credit which was 
mistakenly activated by the bank when I though it was my 
own personal line of credit." 
This, by the way, is the only place in the record in which Bushi addresses in any way the 
proofs of the defendants concerning his conversion of Company funds through use of the 
Wells Fargo line of credit. 
Bushi' s denial that his pirating of Company funds constitutes a conversion is 
made without citation to legal authority. Legal authority indicates exactly the opposite. 
" ... to create liability for conversion it is not necessary that 
the actor intends to commit a trespass or a conversion; and 
the actor may be liable where he has in fact exercised 
dominion or control, although he may be quite unaware of 
the existence of the rights to which he interferes. 
Wiseman v. Schaffer, 115 Id 537, 541 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Correctly stated, Bushi does not deny committing conversion. Actually, he denies 
committing embezzlement. Embezzlement occurs when a person who has lawful 
possession of the property of another, with fraudulent intent, appropriates the property to 
his own use. State v. Stricklin, 136 Id 264,269 (Ct. of App. 2001). Bushi's only 
statement on the issue, as quoted above, was a denial of embezzlement. He had not been 
accused of embezzlement by the defendants and the court below did not find him guilty 
of embezzlement, notwithstanding whether an embezzlement had actually occurred. That 
was not before the Court. 
Next, Bushi makes the outrageous allegation that the litany of his sins in 
connection with the Company line of credit "are contained only in the first count of 
Appellee's counterclaim which has been dismissed." (Appellant's Brief, p. 11) 
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(Emphasis added.) In fact, the Verified Answer and Counterclaim unequivocally states 
these allegations in the Third Separate Defense (Record p.p. 26 ff), they are reiterated in 
the Fourth Separate Defense (Record p. 28) and the Fifth Separate Defense (Record p. 
29) and in the Second Count of the Counterclaim, paragraph 1 (Record p. 33). The Order 
of the Court to which Bushi refers provides, in pertinent part, "The first cause of action of 
the counterclaim is hereby dismissed". (Record p. 91). The Order does not dismiss the 
Third Separate Defense, Fourth Separate Defense, Fifth Separate Defense and Second 
Count of the Counterclaim. Here, I.R.C.P. Rule 3.3(a)(l) is implicated. We will expect 
Bushi' s counsel to respond in his reply brief. 
Bushi next contends (Appellant's Brief, p.11) that "The District Court's view of 
the case was tainted by the allegations of conversion." Of course, these weren't 
allegations, they are facts which are uncontested in the Record: 
THIRD SEPARATE DEFENSE 
Breach Of Contract By Bushi. 
1. At all times relevant prior to January 30, 
2006, Bushi was a member of Defendant Sage, a signatory 
to the Operating Agreement, (Exhibit A) and was bound by 
the terms and conditions of the Operating Agreement. 
2. In July 3, 2003 Sage obtained a business line 
of credit loan from Wells Fargo Bank (the Bank) under 
account No. 5474 6488 0066 7547 (the business line of 
credit). The business line of credit was intended to serve as 
a back up source of liquidity for Sage if and when needed. 
3. Since the inception of the business line of 
credit it has never been used by Sage for Company 
purposes. 
4. In October, 2005, a mailing was received by 
Sage from the Bank which indicated that substantial funds 
had been borrowed under the business line of credit. 
Neither Sage's business manager nor any of the members 
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other than Bushi had any knowledge of the borrowings as 
aforesaid prior to the receipt of the referenced notice nor 
had they in any way consented or agreed to said 
borrowings. 
5. Following receipt of the mailing aforesaid, Sage 
contacted the Bank and requested information concerning 
borrowings under the business line of credit. The 
information provided by the Bank indicated that the 
borrowings under the business line of credit had been made 
by Bushi and that the funds received by the borrowings had 
been paid over to Bushi on his authorization and request. 
The Bank pointed out that Bushi was a member of Sage 
and had been one of the authorized signatories for the 
business line of credit. 
6. Information provided by the Bank further 
indicated that the Bank had been instructed to forward all 
the business line of credit account statements to the address 
of 890 Curling, Boise, Idaho which was Bushi' s address, 
not the address of Sage. 
7. The other members of Sage confronted 
Bushi with the information received from the bank and 
demanded an explanation. Bushi acknowledged that he had 
personally received the funds borrowed under the business 
line of credit and converted those funds for his own use. 
The other members of Sage demanded that Bushi 
immediately repay the funds which he had converted from 
his line of credit. Then, and on numerous subsequent 
occasions, Bushi promised to pay all the funds which he 
had converted from the business line of credit, but through 
the date of the termination of his membership on January 
30,2006, he had failed to make such payment. Bushi failed 
to repay the funds he had converted as aforesaid until June 
2006, after Sage had filed a civil action against him in the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the 
County of Ada under Case No. CVOC 0610585. A true 
copy of the Verified Complaint in that action is appended 
hereto as Exhibit C and incorporated herein by reference. 
5. [sic] In addition to being an unlawful conversion 
of funds, the actions of Bushi as aforesaid were also a 
breach of the express provisions of the Operating 
Agreement (Exhibit A), in particular, Article VI, Section 
2.6 which provides as follows: 
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"2. Two Thirds Majority - the following actions require 
the consent of two-thirds majority of the members: ... 
2.6. The lending of money, investment and 
reinvestment of the Company's funds, and receipt and 
holding of property of security for repayment, including, 
without limitation, the loaning of money to and otherwise 
helping members, officers, employees and agents." 
As noted aforesaid, none of the other members voted in 
favor of making any "loan" to Bushi or even had 
knowledge that he was converting the Company's funds to 
his own use. See, Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878 (Ct. 
App. 1984). 
Finally, Bushi complains because his conversion of Company funds was not a stated 
ground for removal of the Operating Agreement, so it was necessary for the other 
members to amend the Operating Agreement to allow termination of his membership. In 
other words, Bushi had breached the Operating Agreement and breached his fiduciary 
duty to the Company and the other members, but should be allowed to get away with it 
because there was no specific punishment provided in the Operating Agreement. Of 
course the Operating Agreement did provide express provisions which allowed the other 
members to amend it. It is hard to understand how the amendment of the Operating 
Agreement to add a provision which permitted termination ofBushi's membership 
violated any legal standard. No real explanation has ever been provided by Bushi. 
6. Sage Did Not Breach Its Fiduciary Duties to Bushi 
a. Bushi Breached His Duties Under the Operating Agreement 
and His Fiduciary Duty to the Company 
An amendment under the Operating Agreement to allow Bushi's elimination for 
breaching the Agreement does not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. The Virginia 
Supreme Court articulates this legal principle in a recent decision, Gowin v. Granite 
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Depot, LLC., 272 Va., 246,634 S.E.2d 714 (2006). There the court held that the majority 
member did not breach his fiduciary duty to the limited liability company by amending 
the articles of organization to allow elimination of a member for nonpayment of his 
capital contribution. 634 S.E.2d at 722. In performing this analysis, the Court noted 
"Whether an act constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty will depend on the circumstances 
of each case." Id In the Virginia case, the complaining member had an obligation to put 
the money into the company and he did not. In our case, Bushi had an obligation not to 
talce the money out and he did. Both ways, the Company was short of the money, both 
ways, amending the Operating Agreement to address the problem was not a breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
Bushi converted $61,000 in Company funds to his own use and used them to pay 
personal expenses. In Purcell v. Southern Hill Investments, LLC, 847 N.E.2d 1991 (Ind. 
App., 2006), the Court held that Purcell breached his fiduciary duty when he used 
Company funds to repay a personal loan without the knowledge or consent of the other 
members. Id. at p. 999. 
b. The Other Members of Sage Acted in Fulfillment of Their 
Fiduciary Duties to the Company and One Another When 
They Removed Bushi As a Member 
Fiduciary duties do not run in one direction only. Bushi conveniently chooses to 
ignore the fiduciary duties which Bushi owed to Sage and the other members. Bushi also 
chose to ignore the fiduciary duties which other Sage members owe to one another and to 
the Company. This leads to some very interesting questions. When the other Sage 
members voted, was their only obligation to preserve the economic interests of Bushi? 
We suggest not. Rather, their true fiduciary duties lay in preserving interests of the 
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Company and each of them was obligated to preserve the interests of the other two 
members. In fact, a failure to remove Bushi, given his established and undisputed course 
of conduct, would have been a breach of fiduciary duty by each member of Sage of the 
fiduciary duty owed to the other members ( other than Bushi) and to the Company itself. 
How could one possibly justify keeping as a member a person who had converted 
Company funds to his own use, apparently acted to conceal that conversion, and failed to 
reimburse the funds when notified? If no action had been taken, then perhaps Kent could 
have sued Novak, Novak could have sued Kent, both of them could have sued Negron 
and vice versa. These would have been much better causes of action than the one that 
Bushi now brings. 
c. Under Idaho Case Law Sage's Actions in Compliance with the 
Express Terms of the Operating Agreement Are NOT a 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty. 
Existing Idaho case law follows this rule - Bushi has failed to mention the one 
Idaho decision which is clearly on point, Tolley v. THI Co., 140 Idaho 253, 92 P.3d 513 
(2004). That case holds squarely against Bushi. Tolley was a shareholder in the 
defendant family corporation as a result of shares transferred to her in a divorce. The 
stock was subject to a stock purchase and redemption agreement executed by Tolley's 
former spouse. At the time he signed the agreement, Tolley signed a spousal's consent to 
be bound by the terms of the agreement. The divorce settlement agreement between 
Tolley and her spouse clearly contemplated that she would be paid for the stock by the 
corporation. However, the stockholder agreement gave the corporation the right, but not 
the obligation, to purchase the stock. The corporation refused to purchase the stock. 
Tolley contended that this was a breach of a fiduciary duty owed to her by the 
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corporation. The court held that even though Tolley was a shareholder, and the 
corporation's refusal resulted in frustration of her reasonable economic expectation, since 
the corporation was acting in accordance with the terms of the shareholders' agreement, 
there was no breach of fiduciary duty. 140 Idaho at 261. 
Our case presents the other side of the same coin which the court examined in 
Tolley. In Tolley, the corporation relied on the provision of the shareholder's agreement 
and refused to purchase the stock. In our case, the company (Sage) is exercising its right 
under the agreement to buy Bushi' s interest. In both instances, we are dealing with the 
contractual rights of the company/corporation to buy or not to buy the interests of a 
minority owner. Sage respectfully submits that the holding in Tolley governs in this case. 
d. Other Jurisdictions Concur, No Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Occurs Where the Action Taken is Permitted Under the 
Agreement. 
In Bishop of Victoria Corp. Sole v. Corporate Business Park, LLC, 138 Wash. 
App. 443, 158, P.3d 1183 (App. Div. 2, 2007), the Court held that Bishop of Victoria 
had not breached his fiduciary duty because it had acted in compliance with the express 
terms of the Operating Agreement. The company was owned by Joseph Finley and the 
Bishop of Victor Corp. Sole (BV). Finley had approached BV with an idea for an 
investment opportunity proposing that he and BV purchase a parcel ofland in Lacey, 
Washington, with the intention of reselling it at a substantial profit. Finley agreed to 
contribute his labor and expertise and BV agreed to contribute financially. There was no 
evidence presented that either party's obligation to contribute was quantified. 158 P.3d 
1186. After the passage of several years, the property had not been sold. Each party 
suspected the others motives. BV took the perspective that Finley had no personal 
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interest in selling the property unless he could sell it for a premium price that might never 
be available. Finley accused BV of wanting to sell the property for pennies on the dollar 
so it could withdraw for what it considered to be a bad investment. Id. at p. 1187. At 
that point in time, the company's property was already substantially mortgaged and the 
company had no additional funds. BV refused to make any further mortgage payments 
and the mortgage on the property was foreclosed. BV subsequently found a buyer for the 
property in an amount sufficient to pay off the mortgage debts owed by the company. 
Finley claimed that BV had breached its fiduciary duty when it refused to continue 
making the mortgage payments on the property and when it had located a purchaser for 
the property in an amount sufficient to pay off the mortgage debt. Finley's expectation of 
future profit on resale of the property was thwarted. However, the court held that, as a 
matter oflaw, BV had not breached any fiduciary duties owed to Finley because BV had 
always acted in compliance with the terms and conditions of the agreements between the 
parties. Thus, a frustrated expectation of future profit is not a strong enough hook to 
support a claim of breach of fiduciary duty where the party charged has acted in 
accordance with the requirements of the agreements between the parties. Id. at 119 2. 
In McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enterprises, 132 Ohio App.3d 657, 725 N.E.2d 
1193, Ohio App. 10 Dist. ( 1999), the court held that there had been no breach of fiduciary 
duty because the Operating Agreement permitted the action taken. Under the Operating 
Agreement, the members were not prohibited from engaging in a venture that was 
competitive with the company's investing in an operating agreement in a national hockey 
league franchise. Thus, there was no violation of fiduciary duty. 725 N.E.2d at 1206, 
1207. Likewise, in Ledford v. Smith, 274 Ga. App. 714, 618 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. App. 
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2005), the Court held that the defendant had not breached his fiduciary duty because the 
actions he had taken were permitted under the operating agreement. 618 S.E.2d at 636. 
In so holding, the court noted, any fiduciary duties that a member of a limited liability 
company has may be modified or eliminated (with a few exceptions) by the operating 
agreement. The exceptions were stated in the Georgia, LLC, statutes. Id. These three 
cases all deal with a conflict of interest, a seizure by a member of an economic 
opportunity which might otherwise have belonged to the company. Absent an operating 
agreement, there are many decisions which would characterize these types of conduct as 
breaches of fiduciary duty, but if done in accordance with the provisions of an operating 
agreement, they are not. 
Ironically, Bushi is guilty of conduct in this same category - he acknowledges 
that he went to work with a psychiatric group that competes with Sage for hospital 
contracts. However, he claims the shelter of the Operating Agreement. In other words, 
he gets the shelter of the Agreement, but the defendants do not. What is sauce for the 
goose is sauce for the gander. 
e. The Unreported Decisions Cited by Bushi are Not Proper 
Precedent and are Distinguishable on Their Facts. 
At Page 21 of Appellant's Brief, he claims, incorrectly, that other jurisdictions have 
found a breach of fiduciary duty under "similar circumstances". As authority, he relies 
on two unreported decisions which are not a proper citation of authority for a brief before 
the Idaho Supreme Court. See I. S.Ct. Op.R. 15(£). 
The first unreported case which Bushi relies on was Anderson v. Wilder, 2003 
Westlaw 22768666 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003). This case illustrates the peril of 
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reliance upon unreported decisions. It holds contrary to reported Tennessee case 
precedent. The reported decision of McGee v. Best, 106 S.W.3d 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2002) held, based on the plain language of the Tennessee LLC statute, that a member of a 
Tennessee LLC owed a fiduciary duty only to the company, not to the other members. Id. 
at pp. 63, 64. Secondly, Anderson is easily distinguished from the case at hand on its 
facts. In Anderson there was no indication of wrongful conduct by the member who was 
removed. Further, in Anderson, the other members turned around and sold the removed 
members' interest for a tidy profit one month later - clear evidence of a wrongful motive. 
In our case there is no evidence of a wrongful motive by the defendant members, merely 
Bushi' s speculation and conjecture about their motive, none of which is admissible 
evidence. 
Bushi's second unreported case, Zulawski v. Taylor, 2005 Westlaw 3823584 
(N.Y. Supp.) is also easily distinguished on its facts. In that case, there was no indication 
of wrongful conduct by Zulawski. The stated facts indicated Zulawski was the owner of 
an interior decorating business which was stolen from him by an investor who made him 
sign documents under duress. These facts are easily distinguished from the case at hand. 
Under New York law, the question of whether a fiduciary relationship exists between 
parties is necessarily fact specific to a particular case. Weiner v. Lazard Everest Co., 241 
A.D.2d 114, 122 (1 st App. Dept. 1998). 
B. Bushi has not Raised a Material Issue of Fact as to Whether Sage's 
Other Members Breached Their Fiduciary Duties. 
In this section ofBushi's brief, he raises a debate about the reasons motivating the 
other members when they terminated his membership. But the District Court said: 
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"Given the Operating Agreement language, the Members' reasons for dissociation are 
irrelevant to this decision." Order Granting Summary Judgment, p. 14, I. 15 (Record p. 
I 09) Further, Bushi relies on conclusory assertion unsupported by specific facts. 
" ... conclusory assertions unsupported by specific facts are insufficient to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Goodman v. Lathrop, 143 Idaho 
622, 627 (2007) citing, State v. Shama Res. Ltd P'ship, 127 Idaho 267, 271 (1995); 
Nanney v Linella, Inc., 130 Idaho 477,480 (Ct. App. 1997). 
We have all enjoyed the performances of magicians -- "Magic" -- now you see it, 
now you don't, primarily through the use of distraction. You look at the magician's 
waving hand while his other hand disappears in the fold of his cape to produce the rabbit. 
This is the tactic which Bushi is now attempting. A tactic of distraction. Bushi spends 
pages and pages of argument on an abstract discussion on the concept of fiduciary duty 
and an urging that Idaho courts should apply fiduciary duty standards to the members of 
limited liability companies. The hand waves once. 
The second wave of the hand consists of a lengthy discussion of Bushi' s personal 
economic expectations and some uncorroborated conjecture about why the other 
members wanted to remove him. As noted above, he knows why, he is just trying to 
distract the Court. Certainly, the other members of Sage had plenty of complaints against 
Bushi, but it is clear what broke the camel's back. It was a very large straw indeed -
$61,000 worth. 
In all these arguments about fiduciary duty, Bushi has cited no precedent, no legal 
authority whatsoever, which would support on a factual basis that the actions taken by the 
other members of Sage really constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. Respondents have 
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attempted to supply correct legal authority to the Court. We hope that the Court notices 
the differences in these arguments. 
Bushi' s other transgressions were not the straw that broke the camel's back, 
however, he is quite free in misrepresenting the facts surrounding them. At Page 18 of 
Appellant's Brief, Bushi says "Appellees informed Dr. Bushi that they wanted him out as 
a member of Sage because he was dating a nurse practitioner. See Record, Ex. 11, 1 27. 
First, this is only Bushi' s statement about his recollection of the statement of other 
persons. The attachment to his Affidavit only includes an agenda that says "Discuss NP". 
He goes on to say "Of course, nothing in the Operating Agreement or any other 
agreement precludes such activity", conveniently making no reference to the potential 
violations of Federal law that might result from such a relationship. 
Next, Appellant says "Plaintiff was obviously concerned about the future of his 
practice with Sage, and arranged also to become a part of another psychiatric group in 
November in 2005." Bushi goes on to say that Article VI, Paragraph 8 of the Operating 
Agreement "specifically allows a member to become associated with a competing 
company." 
Actually, this isn't what the Agreement says: 
"A Member shall be entitled to enter into transactions that 
may be considered to be competitive with, or a business 
opportunity that may be beneficial to the Company." 
This Court can see the actual agreement refers to "transactions" not to "competing 
company." As Bushi has previously noted, the psychiatrists in this group also had 
individual patients outside the group (Appellant's Brief, p. 2). The Plaintiff has 
mischaracterized the Agreement. 
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The next point, and this one spins like a tornado, is on Page 18 of Appellant's 
Brief where, bold and underlined, he says "Voting the Plaintiff would not be entitled to 
any profit sharing starting in the year 2006 due to his connection with our competitor." 
was a breach of fiduciary duty. Our response is, so what, it never happened. No question 
the other members were angry. Who would not have been angry? They spoke 
intemperately, but, in fact, they sent him the money. This was simply a threat and they 
not only did not follow through with the threat, they tendered him a check. The numbers 
in this case are all contained in the Affidavit of Craig Rasmussen, Ex. 4. See in particular 
Paragraphs 7 and 8 and Exhibit A which demonstrate that the monies tendered to Bushi 
included his profit participation for the first month of 2006 - the time period before he 
was disassociated. They offered to pay him his money. This was not a breach of 
fiduciary duty. He just would not take the money. 
C. Sage Did Not Breach its Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
Under Idaho law and under the law of numerous sister jurisdictions, the concepts 
of fiduciary duty and the concept of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing become 
intertwined. While Idaho has little case law on fiduciary duty, it has substantial case law 
on the same concept of good faith and fair dealing as applied to the law of the contracts. 
Here, in particular, because the Operating Agreement is so clearly an issue, these become 
especially relevant. 
The Operating Agreement by its terms reserved a right to amend that Agreement 
by the vote of all of the members less one. Bushi now contends that the amendment of 
the Agreement, which permitted the other members to vote him out of the Company, 
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violates a covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in the Operating Agreement. 
However, Bushi' s assertion is direct conflict with controlling case precedent. 
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing constitutes a promise made 
implicit by law in every contract. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. v. Idaho 1'1 National Bank, 
121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d at 863, citing Burton v. Atomic Workers Federal Credit Union, 
119 Idaho 17, 803 P.2d 518 (1990). The covenant requires that the parties perform, in 
good faith, and a violation occurs only when either party violates, nullifies or 
significantly impairs any benefit of the contract. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 
134 Idaho 738, 9 P.2d 1204, 1216 (2000), citing Bliss Valley Foods, 824 p.2d at 863. No 
duty will be implied which is contrary to the terms of the contract negotiated and 
executed by the parties. Id., citing First Security Bank of Idaho v. Gaige, 115 Idaho 172, 
765 P.2d 683, 687 (1988); Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 115 Idaho 298, 766 P.2d 
768, 770 (1988). The duty does not arise until a contract exists and therefore caunot 
apply to negotiations. 
Without a breach of the express terms of a contract, the Court will "necessarily 
conclude that there was no breach of the implied covenant." See, Totman v. Eastern 
Idaho Technical College, 129 Idaho 714, 931 P.2d 1232, 1236 (App.1997), citing 
Clement, 766 P.2d at 770; Olson v. Idaho State University, 125 Idaho 177, 868 P.2d 505, 
510 (App.1994). "[B]y merely standing upon the terms of a contract, a party does not fail 
to deal honestly with another party regardless of how onerous the terms of that contract 
may be." Bliss Valley Foods, 824 P.2d at 863. 
Bushi asks the Court to impose a duty of good faith and fair dealing which is 
contrary to express rights of the other members under the Operating Agreement. Under 
Respondent's Brief - Page 31 
Idaho law, however, "The covenant of good faith cannot override an express provision of 
the contract." Independence Lead Mines Company v. Hecla Mining Company, 143 Idaho 
22, _, 137 P.2d 409, 413(2006). "There is no basis for claiming implied terms contrary 
to express rights contained in the parties' agreement." "no covenant will be implied 
which is contrary to the terms of the contract negotiated and executed by the parties." Id. 
(citing Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 750, 9 P.3d 1204, 1216 
(2000)). 
A recent decision of the Idaho Supreme Court applied this same legal principle to 
a contract which contained a right to amend. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC., 140 
Idaho 254, 93 P.2d 685 (2004). In that case, the Shawvers agreed to purchase property 
governed by restrictive covenants which could be amended by written consent of 
seventy-five percent of the existing lot owners. At the time of contracting, they received 
a copy of the original covenants. Subsequently, Huckleberry filed an amendment to the 
covenants which increased the minimum house size required in the subdivision. The 
Shawvers wanted to build a smaller house. They took the position that they were bound 
only by the original CC & Rs, not by the subsequent amendment. Id. at 362. However, 
the Court held that the Shawvers were bound by the terms of the amended CC & Rs 
"Under the express provisions of the sale agreement, amendments to the existing CC & 
Rs could be adopted upon written consent of at least seventy-five percent of the existing 
lot owners. To imply that Huckleberry was obligated to perform the Sale Agreement 
subject only to the original recorded CC & Rs would be contrary to the terms of the 
contract negotiated and executed by the parties." Id. 
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The Shawvers also claimed that Huckleberry's conduct constituted a breach of 
good faith and fair dealing. The Court held "The implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is a covenant implied by law in the parties' contract. (Citation Omitted.) No 
covenant will be implied which is contrary to the terms of the contract negotiated and 
executed by the parties." Id Thus, the Court held that there was also no violation of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
The facts of Shawver are clearly analogous to our case. In both instances, the 
parties were subject to an agreement which provided by its terms that it could be 
amended. The agreement was subsequently amended in accordance with its terms. The 
Court squarely held that such an amendment did not constitute a violation of a covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. Sage respectfully submits that Shawvers is controlling on 
the present case. 
D. Sage Asked for Attorneys Fees under I.C. 12-120(3) as a Prevailing 
Party in a Commercial Transaction. 
First, it should be noted that Sage is a defendant in this action. Bushi, the 
Plaintiff, included claims for attorney's fees under LC. 12-120 (Record pp. 19-20). See, 
Magic Lantern Productions, Inc. v. Do/sat, 126 Idaho 805 (1993) where the court 
considered plaintiffs attorney fees claim under I. C. § 12-120 as a basis for awarding fees 
to a prevailing defendant. 
Sage's Motion for Summary Judgment requested judgment "awarding attorney's 
fees and costs to defendant/counterclaimants in this action as a prevailing party." 
(Record p. 87). 
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Sage's Memorandum argued: "It is undisputed that the claim and causes of action 
in this case are a commercial dispute subject to an award of attorney's fees and costs 
pursuant to the provisions ofI.C. § 12-120. See Verified Complaint, ,r 57. In the event 
that this Court sees fit to grant Sage's Summary Judgment as to all claims, then Sage 
would be a prevailing party and entitled to such an award." (Ex. 5 at p. 11) 
E. Bushi Had an Opportunity to Oppose an Award of Attorney's Fees 
Under 12-120(3), Made His Argument and Lost. 
The Court granted summary judgment to Sage on all claims and ordered Sage to 
prepare an appropriate judgment. 
In the proposed judgment, Sage included an award for costs and attorney fees. In 
response, Bushi objected and wrote as follows: 
"Idaho Code 120(3) is inapplicable because this case did 
not involve a commercial transaction which was both 
integral to the claim and constitute the basis upon which the 
party was attempting to recover. See Blimka v. My Web 
Wholesaler, 143 Idaho 723 (2007); see Tolley v. Thi Co., 
140 Idaho 253 (2004). Analogous to the facts and holding 
in the Tolley case, the instant case involved a complaint to 
enforce Dr. Bushi' s membership rights under the Operating 
Agreement. The case did not arise from a "commercial 
transaction" between the parties. See Tolley, 140 Idaho at 
262-63. Albiet the lawsuit involved limited liability 
company matters, this did not implicate a commercial 
transaction. Id.; seeidaho Newspaper Foundation v, City of 
Cascade, 117 Idaho 422 (Ct. App. 1990). In Tolley, the 
Idaho Supreme Court provided that a commercial 
transaction does not arise in every instance in which a 
commercial relationship exists. Id.; see Idaho Newspaper 
Foundation, supra, 117 Idaho 422. Accordingly, the Court 
should follow this case precedent and deny any motion for 
award of attorneys' fees under Idaho Code 12-120(3). 
Plaintiffs Objection to the Defendants' Proposed Form of Summary Judgment, p. 3 
(Record pp. 114, 120) 
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Sage responded on August 6, 2007, and specifically addressed the reason that 
attorney fees are appropriate under LC.§ 12-120(3). Defendant/Counterclaimant's 
Reply to Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants' Proposed Form of Summary Judgment, pp. 
3-5 (Record pp. 124-126). Sage analyzed each case raised by Bushi. 
It is true that in the Affidavit of the Memorandum of Costs and Fees, Sage does 
not reference LC.§ 12-120. But there is no requirement in Rules 54(d)(5) or 54(e)(5) 
that such a reference be included there. Sage has always requested fees under LC. § 12-
120(3) and at oral argument, Sage argued Sage was entitled to fees because a commercial 
transaction was integral to the claims. 
This is not like the Bingham v. Montane Resources Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 
987 P.2d 1035 (1999). In Bingham, neither party ever sought attorney fees under LC.§ 
45-413, the statute the trial court used to award attorney fees. The Idaho Supreme Court 
correctly ruled that a trial court cannot sua sponte award attorney fees on a basis not 
asserted by the parties. 
In this case, both Sage and Bushi sought attorney fees under LC.§ 12-120(3). 
Moreover, Sage Health Care specifically asked for attorney fees based on LC. § 12-
120(3) in its Motion for Sununary Judgment. Sage and Bushi specifically briefed an 
award under this statute, and Sage clearly articulated it wanted attorney fees at the oral 
argument because the commercial transaction was integral to the claims and constituted 
the based upon which Bushi was attempting to recover. The rationale in Bingham is due 
process. Here Bushi carefully briefed any award of attorney fees under LC.§ 12-120(3) 
in response to the proposed judgment. There are no due process problems. Therefore, 
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the District Court correctly found that Sage did assert attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 12-
120(3). 
F. The Attorney's Fees and Discretionary Costs Awarded by the Court 
Below Were Within the Court's Sound Discretion. 
At the first hearing before the Court, having observed the tactics and tendencies of 
Bushi's counsel, discussing scheduling, and the delays requested for discovery, Sage's 
counsel expressed his trepidations: "The only problem I've got is I don't want this 
lawsuit to assume Dickinsonian proportions." (TR 31-7). At the same hearing, Sage's 
counsel was saying: "And to let you know, there will be complicated issues, there will be 
complicated motions. We're going to have accountants and testimony and breach of 
fiduciary duty and breach of the covenant of good faith and it is a lot more complicated." 
(TR 32-24 ff). 
At that point, on March 22, 2007, Sage had just filed a simple, straight forward 
Motion for Summary Judgment, supported by an 11 page memorandum. But Bushi's 
counsel made things "a lot more complicated," just as he said. Now that he has lost, and 
the bill comes due, he should not complain. He is hoist by his own petard. 
Sage requested an award of $78,414.44 in attorney fees. Bushi contested the 
reasonableness of these attorney fees, arguing many of the fees were duplicative, 
unreasonable, and outrageous. However, in making that objection, Bushi did not identify 
with any particularity what he considers duplicative, unreasonable, and outrageous. More 
specifically, he contended as follows: 
The Defendants request for an award of attorney 
fees in the amount of $78,414.44 is unreasonable and 
outrageous. With the exception of the limited time entries 
for telephone conferences, Plaintiff objects to every other 
time entry as blatantly excessive and unreasonable. These 
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time entries appear to present a case of "churning." The 
time and labor actually expended by an attorney is to be 
considered under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A), but it is also to be 
evaluated under a standard of reasonableness. Daisy 
Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 
259,263, 999 P.2d 914,918 (Ct. App. 2000). "A court is 
permitted to examine the reasonableness of the time and 
labor expended by the attorney under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A) 
and need not blindly accept the figures advanced by the 
attorney .... An attorney cannot 'spend' his time 
extravagantly and expect to be compensated by the party 
who loses at trial." Id.; Craft Wall of Idaho, Inc. v. 
Stonebraker, 108 Idaho 704, 706, 701 P.2d 324,326 (Ct. 
App. 1985). Thus, a court may disallow fees that were 
unnecessarily and unreasonably incurred or that were the 
product of attorney "churning." 
Additionally, what has been provided as an 
attachment to the Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
completely fails to satisfy the Defendants' burden under 
Rule 54(e)(3). Plaintiff objects to the Defendants' use of 
what is either four attorneys, or three attorneys and a 
paralegal, on this noncomplex matter. The billings also 
indicate multiple duplication of work, and excessive time 
billed for the limited explanation of services rendered. 
Again, Plaintiff does not believe the Court should get to 
this detailed analysis, but if it does, Plaintiff challenges the 
time entries on Exhibit A as excessive, unreasonable, 
duplicative, and not necessarily incurred by counsel. 
"Objection and Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants/Counterclaimants 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees", (Ex. Pp.7-8.) This objection is not sufficient. 
Rules 54( e )(1) provides as follows: "In any civil action the court may award 
reasonable attorney fees, which at the discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, 
to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by 
any statute or contract." Determining whether the amount of an attorney fee award is 
reasonable is within the Court's sound discretion. Craft Wall of Idaho, Inc. v. 
Stonebraker, 108 Idaho 704, 701 P.2d 324 (Ct.App. 1985). Rule 54 provides the criteria 
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courts must consider in awarding attorney's fees. Rule 54(e)(3) provides that the Court 
should consider the specified factors in determining the amount of such fees. 
In arriving at its decision, the Court applied all the required factors to determine 
whether the claimed fees were reasonable. The Court reviewed the submissions of the 
parties and the Court's opinion included detailed findings on the Rule 54(e) factors 
(Record,pp. 172-174). 
The Court made a full review of the detailed time records submitted by Sage's 
counsel and made appropriate reductions: 
"With respect to the actual fees, while Bushi failed to 
identify what he considered "excessive, unreasonable, 
duplicative, and not necessarily incurred by counsel," the 
Court did carefully review all the fees. With respect to any 
fees associated with the Motion to Dismiss the Court denies 
those fees. The Court notes that this was not hard to do, 
because the billings attached to Mr. Goodrum's 
supplemental affidavit were very detailed and the time 
spent on the Motion to Dismiss was clearly delineated. The 
Court also removed one item for reading a law review 
article on LLC freeze outs. The rest of the time and labor 
was reasonable. It was not all related to the summary 
judgment motion. A significant amount of time was 
associated with discovery and the accounting requested by 
Bushi. Based on the Court's review the Court finds that the 
amount of$73,233.19 is fair and reasonable. 
The Court, in an exercise of discretion, therefore awards 
Sage Health Care $73,233.19 in reasonable attorney fees." 
(Record, p. 174) 
Sage also moved for an award of discretionary costs, for postage, facsimiles and 
photocopies in the amount of$196.54, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). Sage also asked 
the Court to grant it $5,665.00 in discretionary costs associated with the accountant who 
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prepared a number of the exhibits filed in support of summary judgment and made the 
accounting requested by Bushi. Rule 54(d)(l)(D) provides: 
Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount 
in excess of that listed in subparagraph (C) ["Costs as a 
Matter of Right"], may be allowed upon a showing that 
said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably 
incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed 
against the adverse party. The trial court, in ruling upon 
objections to such discretionary costs contained in the 
memorandum of costs, shall make express findings as to 
why such specific item of discretionary cost should or 
should not be allowed. 
The Court recognized this issue as one of discretion. (Record, p. 17 5) 
The Court found postage, facsimile and photocopying costs were not 
"exceptional" costs as contemplated by the Rule and did not allow them (Record, p.175) 
However, the Court acknowledged that with respect to the accountant's fees, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has expressly rejected the argument that expert witness fees are 
never "exceptional" under Rule 54( d)(l )(D). See Richard J and Esther E. Wooley Trust 
v. DeBest Pluming, Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 186-87, 983 P.2d 834, 840-41 (1999). The Idaho 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, on a number of occasions, affirmed an award 
of discretionary costs for the expense of expert witness fees. See Wooley Trust, 133 
Idaho at 187,983 P.2d at 841; Zimmerman v Volkswagen of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 
851,858,920 P.2d 67, 74 (1996); Beale v. Speck, 127 Idaho 521,537,903 P.2d 110, 126 
(Ct. App. 1995); Bodine v. Bodine, 114 Idaho 163, 167-68, 754 P.2d 1200, 1204-05 (Ct. 
App. 1988) (affirming an award to an accountant). 
The Court found that this case involved the involuntary separation of one member 
from a limited liability company where that member (Bushi) specifically questioned the 
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amount he was owed under the Operating Agreement and specifically pied a claim for an 
equitable accounting in his complaint. The Court found that the legal and factual issues 
raised by Bushi turned directly on the value of his membership and how that value would 
be determined. Therefore, an expert accountant's testimony was, by necessity, an expense 
incurred in response to the issues presented and was an exceptional cost, reasonably 
incurred. 
Therefore, in an exercise of discretion, the Court granted discretionary costs to 
Sage in the amount of$5,665.00 (Record, p. 175). 
G. Bushi's Oppositions to Sage's Fee Application Did Not Comply with 
Court Rules and Bushi Cannot Cure Those Deficiencies by "Arguments" presented 
in the Appellant's Brief. 
In the District Court's Order granting Sage's Motion for Attorneys Fees, the 
District Court pointed out "Bushi does not identify with any particularity what he 
considers duplicative, unreasonable and outrageous (fees)" (Record, p. 170). Then again 
the District Court noted: "With respect to the actual fees, while Bushi failed to identify 
what he considered 'excessive, unreasonable, duplicative and not necessarily incurred by 
counsel,' the Court did carefully review all the fees ... The Court notes that this was not 
hard to do, because the billings attached to Mr. Goodrum's supplemental affidavit were 
very detailed ... " (Record, p. 174). 
At oral argument, Bushi's counsel objected "to every entry other than telephone 
calls". (T .R. I 00-8) and contended "under the Rules of Civil Procedure, no paralegal fees 
are awarded under Rule 54." (T.R. 100-13, 14) 
"Awards of costs and attorneys fees are governed by 
l.R.C.P. 54(d) and 54(e). When attorney fees are requested 
by a litigant, the claim fees must be included in the 
memorandum of costs filed with the court ... An opposing 
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party may object to a requests for costs and attorneys fees 
by filing a motion to disallow them within 14 days after 
the cost memorandum has been served ... Rule 54(d)(6) "is 
designed to establish a deadline for informing the court of 
any objections for items claimed in the memorandum of 
costs" and "enable the trial court expeditiously to rule upon 
such objections and bring the case to a conclusion." 
Nanney v. Line/la, Inc., 130 Idaho 477,481 citing Hooper v. State, 127 Idaho 945,949 
(Ct. App. 1995) and Operating Engs. Local Union 370 v. Goodwin Const. Co. of 
Blackfoot, 104 Idaho 83, 85 (Ct. App. 1982) 
The Nanney decision goes on to state: 
"Also significant is I.R.C.P. 7(b)(I), which requires that 
motions "state with particularity the grounds therefor" and 
that they "set forth the relief or order sought". This 
requirement of particularity is "real and substantial" and 
good practice "demands that the basis for a motion and the 
relief sought shall be clearly stated" so that the other party 
will not suffer surprise or prejudice." Id. citing Patton v. 
Patton, 88 Idaho 288 (1965) and Mason v. Tucker and 
Assoc. S, 125 Idaho 429, 432 (Ct. App. 1994) 
In this case, Bushi seeks to address to deficiencies in his opposition below by adding 
them to his Appellant's Brief. Appellants' Brief pp. 31-42. None of these specific 
objections were raised by Bushi in a timely fashion before the District Court. For the 
Court to now consider these particular objections would violate both the letter and the 
spirit of the Court Rules cited above. These objections were not available for the 
consideration of the District Court or for rebuttal by Sage. They should not be considered 
now. We respectfully request that they be stricken. 
H. Sage is entitled to Attorney's Fees on Appeal as a Prevailing Party in 
a Suit the Gravamen of Which is a Commercial Transaction Pursuant to I.C. 12-
120(3) and IAR 41. 
Sage is entitled to recover attorneys fees incurred on appeal pursuant to LC. § 12-
120(3). The District Court previously determined that Sage was a prevailing party in this 
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litigation and that the gravamen of the litigation was a commercial transaction. Bushi has 
not appealed these aspects of the decision rendered by the Court below. Accordingly, if 
Sage prevails on appeal, Sage is entitled to recover attorneys fees incurred on appeal 
pursuant to LC. 12-120(3) as well as costs in an amount to be determined under IAR 40 
and 41. Nanney v. Linella, Inc., 130 Idaho 477,482 (Ct. App. 1997). 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Sage respectfully contends that based on the facts and arguments advanced above, 
the summary judgment granted by the District Court should be affirmed, the award of 
attorney fees and costs ordered by the District Court should be affirmed, and Sage should 
be awarded its costs and reasonable attorney fees on appeal to be determined under IAR 
40 and 41. 
DATED THIS /-;i:Y"day of August 2008. 
MUNTHER GOODRUM SPERRY, CHARTERED 
By: ~~R~Wy: 
Forrest R. Goodrum, Attorney for Respondents 
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